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This article quantifies Brazil’s loss of U.S. market share to
Mexico between 1992 and 2001 as a result of the entry into
force of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).
An expanded version of the constant market share model
was used to calculate gains and losses in the competitiveness
of Brazilian exports to the United States, by product and by
competitor, for subperiods between 1992 and 2001. The
model showed Mexico to be the country to which Brazil
lost the most market share in the United States between 1992
and 1996. Exchange rate variations and preferential tariff
treatment for Mexico on the U.S. market were equally
important in Brazil’s loss of export competitiveness to
Mexico.
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I
Introduction
Brazil’s share in world exports of manufactured goods
declined sharply between the mid-1980s and the end
of the 1990s, dropping from 1.29% for the five-year
period 1981-1985 to 1.08% in 1986-1990, then to
0.96% in 1991-1995, and ultimately to 0.91% in 1996-
2000. A year after the major currency devaluation of
1999, Brazil’s market share began to show signs of
recovery, with manufactured exports from that country
expected to account for 0.97% of world exports in
2001.1
During the 1990s, Brazil’s share in United States
imports of manufactured goods also fell sharply,
decreasing steadily from 1.41% in 1992 to 1.13% in
1996, where it hovered for the following two years. In
1999, the year of the major currency devaluation, the
country’s share in U.S. imports was down to 1.11%,
from where it recovered slightly to 1.12% in 2000 and
then to 1.27% in 2001, although this was still below
the level posted in 1994.
In geographic terms, the United States was the
market in which Brazil lost the most market share during
the first half of the 1990s.2  A closer look at the losses
and gains of Brazilian manufactured exports between
1992 and 1996 reveals that the biggest losses, in value
terms, were on the U.S. import market, with Mexico
emerging as the main party responsible for those
losses.3  Brazil also lost a considerable share of the
Mexican import market, mainly to U.S. exporters.
Brazilian losses to Mexico and the United States on
the European Union and Asian markets, however, were
negligible and in some cases even negative.4
The foregoing analysis suggests that NAFTA may
have played a significant role in the loss of U.S. market
share by Brazilian exports between 1992 and 1996,
especially vis-à-vis Mexico. Inasmuch as the period
coincides with a strong appreciation of the Brazilian
currency in real terms against both the dollar and the
Mexican peso, however, it is not clear how much of
Brazil’s loss of U.S. market share was a consequence
of NAFTA and how much was due to deterioration in
Brazil’s price- and cost-based competitiveness
indicators.
This study seeks to assess the role of NAFTA and
the exchange rate in the performance of Brazilian
exports to the United States as compared with Mexico’s
export performance to that same country. The constant
market share model will be applied to calculate U.S.
market share gains or losses by product and country
for subperiods between 1992 and 2001. To quantify
Brazil’s losses and gains vis-à-vis Mexico, a
methodology is presented and subsequently applied that
expands the above model by distributing the gains
(losses) of a given country among its competitors
(competitiveness effect).5  This approach also serves to
identify the key commodities involved in Brazil’s losses
to Mexico between 1992 and 1996. A detailed analysis
of trends in the margins of preference for Mexico and
the export prices of selected products between 1992
and 2001 helps to establish the role of NAFTA and the
exchange rate (as well as other determinants of export
prices) in Brazil’s market share losses to Mexico
between 1992 and 1996.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.
Section II briefly discusses the role of relative price
indicators as a means of measuring the export
competitiveness of a particular country or market.
Section III presents the methodology used herein to
obtain a country-based distribution of the variations in
market share of a given country’s exports in a specific
market or country. Section IV analyses the performance
of Brazilian exports in the U.S. market. Section V
examines in greater depth the Brazilian losses to Mexico
in the U.S. market, in terms of the exchange rate
performance of these two countries vis-à-vis the U.S.
The authors wish to express their gratitude for the comments
and suggestions made by one of the referees of CEPAL Review, while
emphasizing that any errors or omissions are their exclusive
responsibility.
1 See World Trade Organization (WTO), Merchandise exporting
countries, www.wto.org.
2 See Chami Batista and Azevedo (1998).
3 See Chami Batista (2001).
4 In fact, Brazil increased its market share at the expense of Mexico
and the United States in Japan, and at the expense of the United
States in the markets of South America (excluding Mercosur), while
it was virtually level with Mexico in the European Union market
and with the United States in the markets of the Asian tigers (China,
Hong Kong, Indonesia, Malaysia, South Korea and Singapore). See
Chami Batista (2001). 5 See Chami Batista (1999).
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dollar, export prices, and tariff barriers to the main
products exported by Brazil and Mexico to the U.S.





In simplified terms, the demand for a country’s exports
can be expressed as a function of world income and
relative price, with the latter indicating export
competitiveness and the former indicating the level of
world demand for imports.
[1]
where:
E j is the value of exports from country j;
P j represents the mean export price of country j;
x j is the volume of exports from country j;
Y is world income;
Pj is the real effective exchange rate of country j.
The real effective exchange rate may be calculated
by adjusting the nominal exchange rate for relative costs
or prices expressed in local currency.6  The calculations
can therefore be based on indicators of relative unit
labour costs and of relative export prices. Accordingly,
this rate can be interpreted as an indicator of the
competitiveness of country j.
Of course, a number of other factors, such as
product quality and the value of after-sales service,
should technically be included in the calculation of this
indicator. For practical reasons, however,
competitiveness indicators are generally confined to
easy-to-measure factors, i.e., those linked to price or
cost differentials. Furthermore, different prices7  or
costs8  and weightings thereof9  can be used, depending
on the purpose of the indicator to be constructed.
For instance, an indicator of the competitiveness
of domestic against imported goods could be the
relationship between a domestic price index and a
basket of price indices of the imported goods’ countries
of origin, weighted for the share of each such country
in the importing country’s total imports. Similarly, the
competitiveness of an exported commodity vis-à-vis
an “international” commodity can be measured by the
relation between the price indices of manufactured
goods10  –as a proxy for export prices– and a basket of
price indices of manufactured goods of the recipient
countries, weighted for the share of each such country
in the total exports of the exporting country. The
competitiveness of a domestic good can generally be
gauged by the relationship between the manufactured
goods price index and a basket of manufactured goods
price indices of the countries that export to and import
from the country in question, weighted for the share of
each such country in the trade of the focus country.
However, even once the purpose of the indicator
has been defined (e.g., to measure the competitiveness
of manufactured exports from a given country), various
problems remain. For instance, variations in a country’s
export prices or unit labour costs may reflect changes
in commodity composition rather than their
competitiveness. Also, some of the indices used to build
these indicators (e.g., unit labour cost) are estimates
( )jrjjejjej PYXPXPE ,** ==
r
6 On the selection and limitations of indicators, see Durand and
Giorno (1987).
7 E.g., consumer price indices,  export price indices and
manufactured goods price indices.
8 E.g., wages, relative cost of labour, or wholesale prices.
9 E.g., export or trade weightings.
10 “…it would in principle be necessary to carry out studies covering
all categories of tradeable goods and services, with as detailed a
breakdown as possible. In practice, such studies are normally
confined to aggregate measures of manufacturing output, because
there are difficulties in extending the analysis to other groups of
products. In particular, many services are traded, but statistics on
service prices are often unreliable. As for transactions in food
products, energy and raw materials, they often take place on world
markets or on highly regulated markets where price differentials
are often more indicative of the importance of regulatory
frameworks than of price competitiveness.” (Durand, Simon and
Webb, 1992, p. 6).
x x
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for the national economy as a whole, and as such they
do not take account of productivity differences that may
exist between the export sectors and sectors that serve
the domestic market.11
A further significant limitation of such price indices
is that they do not reflect the impact of countries with
which the focus country has little or no bilateral trade,
but which compete with it in other markets. Double-
weighted competitiveness indicators attempt to remedy
this shortcoming by allowing for the weight of each
competing country in each market as well as for the
weight of each market.12
Consequently, given the level of aggregation of the
goods being analysed and the inability to distinguish
between direct competition with the domestic output
of importer countries and competition with third
countries in those importer markets, it is important to
acknowledge that any competitiveness indicator
selected will necessarily have limitations.
Likewise, analysing the demand for exports from
country j by using world income as a proxy for import
demand poses two serious problems: it fails to take into
account the economic buoyancy of each country that
imports from country j and it assumes that the income
elasticity of world imports is constant.
The constant market share (CMS)13  model accounts
explicitly for the impact of world demand, product
composition, differences in demand in each country,
and competitiveness vis-à-vis exports from a particular
country. The model can be expressed as follows:
where:
r is the growth rate of world exports between the
periods t and t-1;
ri is the growth rate of world exports of product i
between the periods t and t-1;
rij is the growth rate of world exports of product i to
market j between the periods t and t-1;
Xi is the value of the focus country’s exports of
product i;
Xij is the value of the focus country’s exports of
product i to market j.
The model breaks down into three basic effects
the difference between the increase in value of a
country’s exports over a given period and the increase
that would be required in order for that country to
maintain its share of world exports (i.e., the world
demand for exports effect). A positive difference means
that the country has increased its share in world exports,
while a negative difference indicates a reduction in that
share. The first effect (measured by the first term on
the right-hand side of the equation above) –identified
as the commodity effect, i.e., the composition of
exported merchandise– calculates to what extent market
share gains (losses) can be attributed to the
concentration of exports in goods for which world
demand is growing more rapidly (or slowly) in relative
terms. The second effect (measured by the second term
on the right-hand side of the equation) –identified as
the market effect– calculates to what extent market share
gains (or losses) can be ascribed to the concentration
of exports in markets (countries or destinations) where
demand is growing relatively more rapidly (or more
slowly). The third effect (measured by the third term
on the right-hand side of the equation) –identified as
the competitiveness effect– is calculated as the residual
and estimates to what extent factors other than the
commodity and market effects can explain market share
gains or losses.14
The world demand effect can be isolated by
incorporating it into the dependent variable of equation
[1], redefining it as representing the share of exports
from country j to the rest of the world.15
11 See Kaldor, 1978, p. 106.
12 See Chami Batista and Didier (2000).
13 For the application of this model to Brazilian exports, see Bonelli
(1992), Chami Batista and Azevedo (1998), and Martins and
Moreira (1998).
14 According to Bonelli (1992), the competitiveness effect reflects
not only relative prices but also such other aspects of demand as:
(i) differential rates of improvement in product quality; (ii)
differences in the efficiency of export marketing and financing;
and (iii) differences in the ability to meet demand rapidly. On the
supply side, the single most important factor is probably the
productivity differential between domestic and foreign producers,
for each sector.
15 Note that world income in equation [1] should be interpreted as
a proxy for world imports. Assuming that the income elasticity of
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
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[3]
where:
mksj is the market share of exports from country j in
world imports;
Ej is the value of exports from country j;
M is the value of world imports;
Pj is the mean price of exports from country j;
Pm is the mean price of world imports;
xj is the volume of exports from country j;
m is the volume of world imports;
Pr is the real effective exchange rate of country j.
As can be seen, the mean prices of exports from
country j (Pj) and of world imports (Pm) have a direct
and positive effect16  on market share (mksj) as well as
an indirect effect,17  deriving from the impact of the
real effective exchange rate on the relationship between
the volume exported by country j and the volume of
world imports.
It should be noted, however, that variations in the
ratio Pj/Pm differ from the variations in the
competitiveness indicator, owing to the weighting
system used.
In order to reflect differences in the buoyancy of
each country that imports from country j (i.e., the
market effect), it is necessary to analyse the demand
for country j’s exports in disaggregated fashion, that is
to say, in each recipient country separately:18
[4]
where:
is the market share of country j’s exports in the
imports of country c;
is the value of exports from country j to country c;
Mc is the value of country c’s imports;
is the mean price of country j’s exports to country c;
Pc is the mean price of country c’s imports;
is the volume of country j’s exports to country c;
mc is the volume of country c’s imports;
Pr,c is the price of country j’s exports compared with
the export prices of the other countries competing
in the market of country c.
Thus, it can be seen that the market share of country
j in the imports of country c is a function of country j’s
prices relative to the prices of its competitors in country
c. In other words, the relative price indicator
(competitiveness) now considers only the prices of the
other exporter countries, since domestic producers do
not participate in the import market of their own
country. The Organization for Economic Co-operation
and Development (OECD)19  refers to this indicator as
the “strict competitiveness indicator”. By considering
each market in isolation, the analysis reflects the weight
of each country in competition on third markets.
However, this competitiveness indicator (Pr,c) still
overlooks the differences in composition and buoyancy
of the baskets of products imported by each market
receiving exports from country j. The following formula
takes these differences into account:
[5]
where:
is the market share of country j’s exports of
commodity i in the imports of country c;
is the value of country j’s exports of commodity
i to country c;
is the value of country c’s imports of commodity
i;
is the price of country j’s exports of commodity i
to country c;
is the mean price of country c’s imports of
commodity i;
is the volume of country j’s exports of commodity
i to country c;
is the volume of country c’s imports of
commodity i;
is the relative price of country j’s exports of
commodity i to country c compared with the
export prices of commodity i from the other
countries competing in country c.





















imports is constant, we can write that ,  where: is
the growth rate of world imports; η is the income elasticity of world
imports; and is the growth rate of world income.
16 An increase in Pj relative to Pm increases the market share.
17 A relative increase in Pj increases Pr and reduces market share,
inasmuch as it decreases the volume exported by country j (xj)
relative to the volume of world imports (m).
18 Exports from country j to country c continue to be viewed
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The market share of exports of a given
commodity20  from country of origin j to a given
country of destination (or the variation in that share)
is basically a function of the export price of the
commodity from country j to the recipient country21
relative to the export prices of the same commodity
for the other countries competing in the recipient
country.
It should be noted that the difference between
and Pr,i is that includes the export price from
country j to country c, ( ) while the denominator of
does not; the latter consists exclusively of the
export prices of country j’s competitors in country c.22
Accordingly, most of the problems and
imprecision of competitiveness indicators are
essentially a matter of aggregation. Since a country’s
competitiveness only exists in terms of specific
products and markets,23  attempts to measure it across
all products and in all destination markets by means
of a single indicator will necessarily entail a high
degree of imprecision.
III
Methodology for allocating market-share
variations by competing country
This section elaborates upon a methodology24  for
identifying and quantifying what portion of losses
(gains) in the value of exports from country p to a
particular country or region can be attributed to the
gains (losses) of a country g.
The total value of imports of a country c can be
defined as:
[6]
where the import profile of country c is made up of n
products originating in k countries; and
Mt is the total value of country c’s imports in period t;
Mt is the value of country c’s imports from country j
in period t;
Mt is the value of country c’s imports of commodity i
in period t; and
Mt is the value of country c’s imports of commodity i
from country j in period t.
Country j’s market share (mks) in country c’s
imports of commodity i in period t may thus be defined
as the ratio of the value of country c’s imports of
commodity i from country j to country c’s total imports
of commodity i, i.e.:
[7]
Likewise, country j’s market share in the total
imports of country c may be expressed as:
[8]
We can say, then, that country j loses market share
in commodity i when and it gains
market share when , between the periods
t and t-1.


















































20 Differences in quality are linked essentially to the level of
disaggregation of the analysis or, ultimately, to the definition of
the product. If, for instance, the product is homogeneous, the market





































































21 This price is set in the country of destination and includes –
aside from exchange rate considerations– freight, insurance, point-
of-origin subsidies, different margins of preference granted to each
country, and anti-dumping or countervailing duties.
22 For further details, see Didier (2000).
23 For a microeconomic approach to export competitiveness, see
Porter (1990).
24 To the best of our knowledge, this methodology was first
presented in Chami Batista (1999) and applied in Azevedo (1999)
and Didier (2000). See also Baumann and Franco (2001).
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That is to say, the sum of the market shares of k
countries that export commodity i to market c in period
t is equal to unity, since it represents 100% of the total
value of imports of that commodity. Consequently, the
sum of the variations in the market shares of k countries
that export commodity i to market c between periods t
and t-1 will be equal to zero. In other words, the sum
of the gains is equal to the sum of the losses of each
country’s market share.
The value of country j’s lost market share for
commodity i in a given market is defined thus:
[10]
so that
In other words, country j’s lost market share in
commodity i is equal in value to the difference between
the value of the imports originating in country j in the
last year t that would be necessary to maintain that
country’s market share in commodity i between periods
t and t-1 and the effective value of those imports.
Similarly, the gain in country j’s market share of




Note that , which means that the
sum of the losses of the countries that lost market share
in imports of commodity i by country c is equal to the
sum of the gains of the countries that gained market
share in those imports over the same period.
If p is a country that loses market share in
commodity i over the period from t to t-1 and g is a
country that gains market share in commodity i over
the same period, then the lost market share of country
p in commodity i that can be attributed to the gain of
market share by country g in the same commodity
equals:
[12]
where the first term on the right-hand side corresponds
to the value of the market share lost by country p and
the second term reflects the share of country g
(numerator) in the total gains of all countries that gained
market share over the period in country c’s imports of
commodity i (denominator).25
Considering all (h) commodities i for which
(losing country) and
(gaining countries), the value of the gross total losses
of country p that could be attributed to country g is
defined as:
[13]
Conversely, Pg,p would be the value of the gross
total losses of country g that could be attributed to
country p, and (Pp,g – Pg,p) would be the value of net
losses of country p attributable to country g. The value
of the net losses27  would thus be an ex post indicator
of a country’s competitiveness vis-à-vis its competitors
in a given market.
This indicator, it should be noted, makes it possible
not only to rank competitors of a given country in a
given market, but also to quantify the competitive
advantages and disadvantages of that country with
regard to its competitors.
It can further be seen that the value of the net losses
(gains) depends on the level of disaggregation of the
imports (Mi) of the country c under consideration.
28
Ideally, the more detailed the level of disaggregation
of import data, the better the estimates will be of net
losses or gains per country.















































































































25 Where Ki is the number of countries that gained market share
over the period in country c’s imports of commodity i.
26 Note that the number of countries Ki varies according to
commodity i.
27 Note that this value can be positive (actual losses) or negative.
In the latter case, the absolute value can be considered as being the
value of the net gain.
28 In other words, different levels of disaggregation will produce
different values for net losses or gains.
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IV
Brazil’s export losses and gains,
by competitor country
US$ 3.75 billion. Between 1992 and 1996, however,
Brazil sustained losses totalling US$ 2.6 billion due to
the competitiveness effect.33
When we examine Brazil’s performance between
2000 and 2001, it can be seen that the competitiveness
effect during the period of just one year was equivalent
to US$ 1.49 billion and represented nearly 40% of the
effect observed between 1996 and 2001; indeed, the
figure rises to 61% if Brazilian aircraft exports are
excluded. Consequently, from 1992 to 2000 the
competitiveness effect was still negative –in the amount
of US$ 340 million34 – and would have meant a negative
The performance of Brazilian exports to the United
States during the period 1992-2001 was analysed, using
the traditional methodology of the constant market
share model.29  Inasmuch as the increased margins of
preference granted by the United States to Mexico under
NAFTA were implemented mainly between 1992 and
1996, the performance of Brazilian exports was
examined for that same subperiod. An analysis of
Brazil’s export performance in 2000 and 2001 is also
included, to assess the impact of the sharp devaluation
of the Brazilian currency as from 1999.
Between 1992 and 2001, Brazil had market gains
in the United States totalling US$ 1.15 billion,
equivalent to 16% of Brazil’s exports to the United
States in 1992,30  as may be seen in table 1. This was
the so-called competitiveness effect of Brazilian exports
for the period.31  However, it should be noted that
Brazilian aircraft exports alone were responsible for
an increase of US$ 1.31 billion in Brazil’s market share
in the United States between 1992 and 2001. In other
words, the overall competitiveness effect of all the other
items was slightly negative for the period.32
In terms of subperiods, the market gains by product
occurred mainly between 1996 and 2001, for a total of
29 As was seen in section I, the model only compares data from the
base and final years. The analysis was originally conducted with
eight-digit data covering the period from 1992 to 1996. See Azevedo
(1999) and Chami Batista and Azevedo (2000).
30 Calculations are based on total U.S. import values (FOB) from
Brazil, by product, at six digits of the United States International
Trade Commission classification, which covers a total of 5,117
products. The nine products coming under chapters 98 and 99 were
excluded from the database so that aircraft returned by Brazil to
the United States would not distort the data on Brazilian exports.
The 1992 product classification was harmonized with those of 1996,
2000, and 2001, using a conversion table of the World Trade
Organization.
31 However, Brazil’s exports to the United States were sluggish
and yielded a net negative effect of US$ 2.7 billion. As a result,
Brazil lost U.S. market share equivalent to US$ 1.55 billion. Brazil’s
share of U.S. imports (not including chapters 98 and 99) actually
shrank by 1.41% in 1992 and by 1.22% in 2001.
32 The competitiveness effect of all products other than Brazilian
aircraft was negative in the amount of US$ 162 million.
TABLE 1
Brazil: Net gains (losses) by major competitor
countries
(Millions of dollars)
Country 1992-2001 1996-2001 2000-2001
Mexico -502.2 0.3 145.5
China -877.9 -606.1 -95.7
Japan 941.9 532.4 191.6
United Kingdom 747.2 923.1 72.1
Others 839.8 2 897.3 1 173.5
Total 1 148.4 3 747.0 1 487.0
Source:  Based on data from the U.S. International Trade
Commission (ITC).
33 Values between 1992 and 1996 were calculated as the difference
between the 1992-2001 values and those for 1996-2001, in order
to maintain 2001 as the base year and thus ensure comparability of
the data. The competitiveness effect between 1992 and 1996 is
different if calculated directly, since the gained or lost market share
of Brazil in those two years is multiplied by the value of U.S.
imports in 1996, unlike the value based on 2001. The commodity
effect was negative in both periods, totalling US$ 530 million
between 1992 and 1996 and US$ 2.17 billion between 1996 and
2001. Accordingly, the net effect was negative in the amount of
US$ 3.13 billion between 1992 and 1996, but was positive in the
amount of US$ 1.57 billion between 1996 and 2001.
34 Here again, calculated as the difference between the 1992-2001
and 2000-2001 effects. The net effect was US$ 1.64 billion between
2000 and 2001, with a slightly positive commodity effect, although
this had been negative in the amount of US$ 3.2 billion between
1992 and 2000.
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balance of US$ 1.5 billion had Brazilian aircraft exports
been excluded.35
If we apply the methodology with a view to
identifying the countries in respect of which Brazil
gained or lost market share and then quantify those
losses and gains by competitor country
(competitiveness effect), it can be observed that Brazil
lost market share to Mexico in the amount of US$ 503
million between 1992 and 2001. As noted earlier,
however, in terms of competitiveness Brazil posted net
gains during this period. By country, the gains totalled
US$ 3.78 billion for the period,36  with 64% of that
amount coming from four developed countries: Japan,
the United Kingdom, Canada and France. Net losses
came to US$ 2.63 billion, of which China accounted
for one-third and Mexico 20%. Brazil also lost market
shares vis-à-vis Ireland, India, the countries of the
former Soviet Union, Peru, Vietnam, and the Ivory
Coast, virtually none of which are in the developed
country category.37
Subdividing by periods, Brazil picked up market
share from Mexico between 2000 and 2001 in the
amount of roughly US$ 145 million,38  compared with
losses of US$ 648 million between 1992 and 2000:
US$ 503 million between 1992 and 1996, and US$ 145
million between 1996 and 2000. In other words, the
losses incurred against Mexico were concentrated in
the period between 1992 and 1996. Accordingly, even
though Brazil had a significant and positive
competitiveness effect between 1996 and 2000, it
continued to lose market share to Mexico throughout
that period.
V
Analysis of Mexico’s impact on Brazilian
exports to the United States
The distribution of net losses of Brazilian
competitiveness by competitor country between 1992
and 1996 reveals that Mexico was the principal gainer
of market share, accounting for 26% of those losses,39
followed by China with 12%.40  Figure 1, however,
shows that Brazil’s currency appreciated significantly
against the Mexican peso during the period,41  so it is
not clear how much of Brazil’s loss of U.S. market share
to Mexico is due to NAFTA and how much is due to
deterioration of Brazil’s competitiveness indicators in
terms of costs and prices.
In order to assess the role of NAFTA and the
exchange rate as determining factors in the loss of
Brazilian competitiveness vis-à-vis Mexico between
1992 and 1996, a sample was compiled of the 20
Brazilian exports that lost the most shares to Mexico
during the period. Inasmuch as these items accounted
for 76% of Brazil’s gross losses to Mexico, the sample
is felt to be sufficiently representative.42
Three sets of data were analysed for each product:
(i) Mexico’s weight in the lost Brazilian share for the
35 Also calculated as a difference. Brazil’s gains owing to the
competitiveness effect between 1996 and 1998 only amounted to
US$ 545 million, but rose to US$ 1.71 billion between 1998 and
2000.
36 Includes the net gains of Brazil against countries that reported
net losses to it. It is worth noting that Brazil generally gains in
some products (gross gains) and loses in others (gross losses) with
each competitor country.
37 Losses to the countries in question accounted for 75% of Brazil’s
total net losses for the period.
38 As may be seen in table 1, Brazil lost a marginal share to China
between 2000 and 2001. It actually lost little and to very few
countries during this period, with China accounting for 44.5% of
the losses, Honduras 6.4%, and Chile 5.6%.
39 Competitiveness effect calculated directly.
40 Of the 226 countries analysed, Brazil lost the equivalent of
US$ 2.3 billion to 163 countries and gained US$ 296 million from
63 countries. The percentages cited represent Mexico’s and China’s
share in total Brazilian losses, considering only those countries to
which Brazil lost market share.
41 In real terms, Brazil’s currency appreciated 50% against the
Mexican peso between 1992 and 1996, or 51% if we allow for a
period with a one-year lag (1991-1995), which is the typical interval
for exchange rate variations to generate positive trade effects.
42 Since the gains and losses were calculated by product, Brazil’s
gross losses to Mexico are the sum of the losses in products in
which Brazil lost market share to Mexico, and the gross gains are
the sum of the gains in products in which Brazil gained market
share from Mexico during the period.
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product; (ii) trends in U.S. import prices (CIF) for the
product from Brazil and from Mexico;43  and (iii) the
variation in margins of preference for Mexico as
compared with Brazil.44  The analysis focused on the
period 1992-2001, giving special attention to the
subperiods 1992-1996 and 1996-2001.
For the products in the sample whose relative price
in Brazil dropped between 1992 and 1996 –despite the
currency appreciation– and for which the margin of
preference for Mexico increased over the same period,
NAFTA must have been the determining factor in the
Brazilian losses, since the price competitiveness of those
products did not warrant such losses.45
In cases where Brazil’s relative price rose
concurrently with the increase in the margin of
preference for Mexico, the proportion of each increase
was calculated by attributing to NAFTA the weight of
the variation in the margin of preference over the total
increase.46
For the products in which Brazil did not experience
losses to Mexico between 1992 and 2001 as a result of
the competitiveness effect with that country, that is to
say, those in which Brazil more than recovered in 1996-
2001 the losses incurred vis-à-vis Mexico in 1992-1996,
it was considered that NAFTA had little or no impact on
the losses.
Based on relative prices and the margins of
preference for Brazil and Mexico, the sample can be
divided into four groups: i) products that entered the
United States duty-free both from Brazil and from
Mexico; ii) products for which it was not possible to
obtain reliable relative prices; iii) products whose relative
prices rose during the period 1992-1996; and iv) products
whose relative prices fell during the period 1992-1996.
The products in group iv) account for 46% of the
losses in the sample. In other words, NAFTA was
responsible in principle for nearly half of Brazil’s lost
market share in 1992-1996. As a percentage of Brazilian
exports, this figure is five times greater than the static
estimates of trade diversion from Brazil to Mexico in
the U.S. market, as calculated by Abreu (1994) and
Machado (1993).47  However, a more in-depth analysis
43 (Brazil pricet+1/Mexico pricet+1)/(Brazil pricet/Mexico pricet).
See Buitelaar (1997) for an analysis of relative price indices of
selected Brazilian and Mexican exports to the United States.
44 (1+TBrt+1)/(1+TBrt)/(1+TMxt+1)/(1+TMxt), where TBr is the
import tariff for Brazil and TMx is the tariff for Mexico.
45 Other causes are also possible. The drop in Brazil’s relative price
could have been triggered by poorer product mix, in which case
Mexico would have increased its market share on the strength of a
better mix. Problems or bottlenecks in Brazilian supply flows could
also have contributed to lost market share, in addition to the fall in
relative price. Ascribing the losses exclusively to NAFTA entails
acknowledging the limitations of this methodology in evaluating
such other possible causes. Aside from its tariff advantages, NAFTA
is assumed to have generated externalities that favoured Mexican
exports in terms of capacity to serve U.S. clients, e.g., delivery
times, after-sales service, marketing, and favourable financing
conditions.
46 The weight of NAFTA is equal to (VMPMx)/(VMPMx+VPRBr),
where VMPMx is the variation in the margin of preference for
Mexico and VPRBr is the relative price variation for Brazil.
47 These estimates were prepared ex ante and represent 0.7% of all
Brazilian exports to the United States in 1992. Brazil’s gross losses
to Mexico during 1992-1996 were equivalent to 7.7% of Brazil’s
exports to the United States in 1996. In other words, 46% of those
losses would be equivalent to 3.5% of Brazil’s exports to the United
States in 1996.
FIGURE 1
Mexico/Brazil: Real exchange rate of Brazilian real vs. Mexican new peso,
January 1991 to December 2001
(1992=100)
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of these products would be necessary in order to fine-
tune this observation.
Table 2 presents the four products in the sample
that were not subject to U.S. import duties; these items
accounted for 23% of the sample losses in 1992-1996.
The tariff-free status of the Brazilian goods would be a
reason in itself not to ascribe the losses to NAFTA, and
that hypothesis is further supported by the fact that for
three of the four products, Brazil did not lose market
share to Mexico in 1992-2001. In shrimp exports, Brazil
gained market share in the United States between those
years. In exports of coffee and chemical wood pulp,
Brazil and Mexico both lost market share during the
period.48  Non-monetary gold was the only one of these
exports in which Brazil lost market share to Mexico
between 1992 and 2001, but this represented only 10%
of Brazil’s overall losses for this commodity during the
period. Moreover, Brazil’s relative prices showed an
upward trend from 1992 to 1996, which could account
for the loss of market share, dropping again between
1996 and 2001, which would explain the gains.49
Accordingly, all the available data indicate that the loss
of competitiveness in these four products was the result
of variations in competitiveness indicators based on
relative prices and costs, and was not associated with
NAFTA.
The data on Brazilian and Mexican prices proved
to be insufficient for calculating the relative prices of
five products in the sample, all from the automobile
industry. These items accounted for 25% of Brazil’s
losses in 1992-1996. The low volume or non-existence
of Brazilian or Mexican exports to the United States in
some years, coupled with big variations in product
composition,50  impeded calculations and vitiated the
reliability of relative prices as competitiveness
indicators.
However, Brazilian exports of steering wheels,
steering columns and steering boxes for motor vehicles
(Harmonized System tariff category 870894) presented
indications that NAFTA did play an important role in
Brazil’s losses in 1992-1996. Although the country
recovered some of those losses in 1996-2001, a full
92% of Brazilian losses in 1992-2001 can be attributed
to Mexico,51  despite the strong devaluation of the
Brazilian currency in real terms vis-à-vis the Mexican
peso.52  To a lesser degree, the same phenomenon was
observed with exports of buses53  and diesel and semi-
diesel engines,54  since 45% and one-third respectively
of Brazil’s losses in these products in 1992-2001 also
were attributable to Mexico.55  In gasoline engine
exports,56  Brazil’s losses between 1992 and 2001
cannot be attributed to Mexico, since that country also
lost share in this product in the same market. In this
case, Canada was responsible for 63% of Brazilian
TABLE 2
Products in the sample that enter the United States duty-free
Product Amount lost by Brazil to Mexico Variations in Brazil’s relative price
(US$) (%)
1992-1996 1992-2001 1992-1996 1992-2001
Shrimps -10 095 181 0 10.04 -17.10
Coffee, not roasted, not decaffeinated -35 850 894 0 19.46 3.06
Chemical wood pulp, coniferous -5 277 473 0 19.10 -22.19
Gold, non-monetary -67 143 482 -5 240 104 8.44 -8.25
Source: Based on data from the U.S. International Trade Commission (ITC).
48 Brazil lost share in coffee mainly to Vietnam, Guatemala, Costa
Rica and Nicaragua.
49 Brazil gained market share in three of the four products between
1996 and 2001, losing share only in chemical woodpulp, where
Finland was responsible for 95% of the lost share.
50 Even at the six-digit level a reasonable number of different
products are included.
51 Between 1992 and 1996, Mexico accounted for 80% of Brazil’s
losses in this category.
52 The devaluation reached a level of 129% between 1995 and 2000
and 175% between 1996 and 2001.
53 Motor vehicles for the transport of ten or more persons, including
driver, with a compression-ignition internal combustion piston
engine (diesel or semi-diesel) (HS 870210).
54 HS 840820 (compression-ignition internal combustion piston
engines, diesel or semi-diesel, for the propulsion of vehicles).
55 Between 1992 and 1996, Mexico accounted for 98% and 25%,
respectively, of Brazilian losses in these products.
56 HS 840734 (spark-ignition reciprocating piston engines for
propulsion of vehicles, over 1,000 cc cylinder capacity ).
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losses under this heading during the period indicated.57
In automobile exports (HS 870323), on the other hand,
Brazil increased its share in the U.S. import market,
significantly offsetting in 1996-2001 the losses posted
in 1992-1996. Here, the indicators suggest that NAFTA’s
role in losses between 1992 and 1996 was at best
secondary. The exchange rate and price- and cost-based
indicators were probably the determining causes of
these gains and losses.58
Only four products in the sample showed an
increase in relative prices and margins of preference
for Mexico during the period; they accounted for 6%
of Brazil’s losses to Mexico in the total sample losses.
Looking at the variations in relative prices and margins
of preference in 1992-1996, it can be seen that half of
these losses (3% of the sample) were due to changes in
the margins of preference. In parallel with the exchange
rate trends, all these products posted a drop in relative
prices in 1996-2001 and, except for footwear exports,59
Brazil gained market share over those years. In the
export of semi-finished products of alloy steel (other
than stainless),60  Brazil gained market share between
1992 and 2001: the gains in 1996-2001 were more than
sufficient to offset the losses in 1992-1996. In this case,
it could be posited that NAFTA did not play a significant
role in Brazil’s loss of market share to Mexico between
1992 and 1996.61  The same conclusion holds for
footwear exports, since Mexico had a weight of next to
zero in Brazilian losses between 1992 and 2001 in this
heading.62  Nevertheless, there are two headings63  for
which the increase in margins of preference for Mexico
explains a large part of the increase in Brazil’s relative
prices64  and for which Mexico’s impact on Brazilian
losses remained relatively constant in 1992-1996 and
1992-2001.65  Accordingly, the estimate that half of the
losses in these four products (3% of the sample) is due
to NAFTA is consistent with Mexico’s weight in trade in
these garments.
Finally, there is the group of seven products whose
prices dropped in 1992-1996 but whose margin of
preference for Mexico vis-à-vis Brazil rose during the
period. For two of these products,66  the argument that
NAFTA played a pivotal role in Brazilian losses in 1992-
1996 is underpinned by the continuation of Brazilian
losses to Mexico in 1996-2001, despite major decreases
in the relative prices of Brazilian exports during the
period (see table 3). Mexico’s weight in the loss of
Brazilian market share in these two products between
1992 and 2001 was respectively 94% and 79%. The
same argument could be made, although less strongly,
for the loss of Brazilian market share in cotton T-shirt
exports,67  despite the significant reductions in Brazil’s
relative prices in 1992-1996 and 1996-2001. The weight
of Mexico in these losses was around 50% both in 1992-
2001 and in 1992-1996, despite the slight recovery in
Brazil’s share in the U.S. market between 1996 and
2001.
Brazilian exports of orange juice (HS 200911) are
a good example in this group. Brazil’s relative prices
fell in 1992-1996 and in 1996-2001, while the margin
of preference for Mexico increased throughout the
entire period from 1992 to 2001. In the first subperiod,
the increase in the margin of preference for Mexico
outstripped the decrease in Brazil’s relative prices, so
that the Brazilian price, which was below the Mexican
price after allowing for import duties, became higher
than the Mexican price after the application of duties
in 1996. As a consequence, Brazil lost a substantial
57 Mexico accounted for 54% of Brazil’s losses in this product
between 1992 and 1996, while Japan and Austria accounted for
26% and 17% respectively. Canada did not gain market share in
these products between 1992 and 1996.
58 Between 1996 and 2001, 39% and 11% respectively of Brazil’s
total market gains in the export of gasoline engines and automobiles
to the United States could be attributed to losses by Mexico in
these products.
59 Other footwear with outer soles of rubber, plastics, leather or
composition leather and uppers of leather (HS 640399).
60 Semi-finished products of other alloy steel (HS 722490).
61 This conclusion coincides with our calculations which indicate
that the increase in the margin of preference for Mexico was
responsible for only 1% of the increase in relative price, including
import duties.
62 In this case, the increase in the margin of preference for Mexico
triggered only 6% of the increase in relative price, including import
duties. China was the main country responsible for Brazil’s market
share loss in the United States for this product during the period.
63 Cotton trousers, bib and brace overalls, breeches and shorts (HS
620462) and cotton sweaters, pullovers, sweatshirts, vests and
similar articles (HS 611020).
64 The increase in the margin of preference for Mexico was
responsible for 89% in the case of cotton trousers (HS 620462)
and 26% for cotton sweaters (HS611020).
65 Mexico was responsible for 54% of Brazil’s cotton trousers losses
in 1992-1996 and 48% in 1992-2001; for sweater losses, the
percentages were 21% in 1992-1996 and 17% in 1992-2001.
66 Ceramic sinks, washbasins, washbasin pedestals, baths, bidets,
water closet bowls, flush tanks, urinals and similar sanitary fixtures
other than porcelain and china (HS 691090); and woven fabrics of
cotton, containing 85% or more by weight of cotton, weighing
more than 200 g/m2, of yarns of different colours, denim
(HS 520942).
67 Cotton T-shirts and singlets (HS 610910).
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share of the market between 1992 and 1996, with
Mexico accounting for 76% of that loss. From 1996 to
2001, even though the drop in Brazil’s relative price
was greater than the increase in the margin of preference
for Mexico, Brazil continued to lose market share.
However, losses in this period cannot be attributed to
Mexico but rather to Costa Rica and Belize.68
The other three headings are semi-finished steel
products. The increases in the margins of preference
for Mexico for these products were relatively small
between 1992 and 1996 (less than 1%), but even so,
Brazil lost substantial market share during the period,
despite a significant drop in the relative prices of
Brazilian products after allowing for import duties. For
the product in which Brazil experienced the greatest
losses between 1992 and 1996,69  the losses were
significant between 1992 and 1996, followed by a slight
recovery in the country’s share of the U.S. import
market between 1996 and 2001. Mexico’s weight in
Brazilian losses reached a level of 50% between 1992
and 1996, decreasing during the following period;
however, it remained above 40% between 1992 and
2001. Accordingly, although the increase in margins
of preference for Mexico was marginal, the drop in
Brazil’s relative prices70  suggests that NAFTA played a
dominant role in Brazil’s losses to Mexico between
1992 and 1996. For the other two products,71  Mexico
played a role in Brazil’s loss of market share between
1992 and 1996, but its significance was slight or none
in the losses between 1992 and 2001.72
TABLE 3
Variations in relative prices of Brazil and in margin
of preference for Mexico
Product Six-digit tariff codea Gains (losses) by Brazil Variation in Brazil’s Variation in margin of
vis-à-vis Mexico relative price preference for Mexico
(US$) (%) (%)
1992/1996 1992/2001 1992/1996 1992/2001 1992/1996 1992/2001
Orange juice SH 200911 -43 932 374 -22 434 594 -1.57 -21.43 10.38 22.85
Woven fabrics SH 520942b -30 921 202 -30 451 452 -14.32 -13.20 8.34 7.99
T-shirts SH 610910 -10 958 807 -14 314 872 -20.12 -54.45 7.97 5.91
Washbasins SH 691090 -5 531 216 -9 054 295 -36.42 -43.94 1.97 1.13
Iron and steel SH 720711 -17 321 615 -42 809 -22.29c -53.56 0.52 -0.30
Iron and steel SH 720712 -117 301 374 -31 041 226 -15.85 -12.42 0.16 0.22
Bars SH 721420b -5 423 918 -2 113 210 -15.54 -26.34 0.14 0.14
Source: Prepared by the authors on the basis of data from the U.S. International Trade Commission (ITC).
a HS 200911: frozen orange juice; HS 520942: woven fabrics of cotton, containing 85% or more by weight of cotton, weighing more than
200 g/m2, of yarns of different colours, denim; HS 610910: cotton T-shirts and singlets; HS 691090: ceramic sinks, washbasins, washbasin
pedestals, baths, bidets, water closet bowls, flush tanks, urinals and similar sanitary fixtures other than porcelain and china; HS 720711:
semi-finished products of iron or non-alloy steel, containing by weight less than 0.25% of carbon, of rectangular (including square)
cross-section, the width measuring less than twice the thickness; HS 720712: semi-finished products of iron or non-alloy steel, containing
by weight less than 0.25% of carbon, of rectangular (other than square) cross-section; and HS 721420: bars and rods of iron or non-alloy
steel, containing indentations, ribs, grooves or other deformations produced during the rolling process or twisted after rolling.
b The figures for U.S. imports under this heading in 1992 were obtained by applying the WTO conversion table, owing to changes in the six-
digit tariff classification between 1992 and 1996.
c Figures for the period 1994 to 1996, inasmuch as Mexico did not export to the United States in 1992 and 1993.
68 In the full period from 1992 to 2001, Mexico was responsible
for 33% of Brazil’s total losses in orange juice exports.
69 HS 720712: semi-finished products of iron or non-alloy steel,
containing by weight less than 0.25% of carbon, of rectangular
[other than square] cross-section.
70 This drop did not occur simply between the initial and final
years, but rather followed a gradual trend throughout the period
1992-2001.
71 HS 720711: semi-finished products of iron or non-alloy steel,
containing by weight less than 0.25% of carbon, of rectangular
(including square) cross-section, the width measuring less than
twice the breadth; and HS 721420: bars and rods of iron or non-
alloy steel, containing indentations, r ibs, grooves or other
deformations produced during the rolling process or twisted after
rolling.
72 Mexico accounted for 80% of Brazil’s lost market share in iron
bars (HS 721420) between 1992 and 1996, but this percentage
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Thus, although Brazilian losses to Mexico between
1992 and 1996 could be attributed to NAFTA as Brazilian
prices became gradually more competitive with those
of Mexico, the loss of competitiveness by Mexico in
1996-2001 prompted other countries to occupy the
market share lost by Brazil. These two products,
however, accounted for only 3% of Brazilian losses to
Mexico in the total losses of the sample.
VI
Conclusions
Disaggregated analysis of a market’s imports by product
and country of origin makes it possible to identify and
quantify losses (gains) of market share by an exporting
country vis-à-vis each of its competitors in that market,
and to link those losses (gains) to competitiveness
indicators based on the prices of the exporting countries.
As a result of the loss of market share by Brazilian
exports in the U.S. import market between 1992 and
1996, Brazil lost export revenue in an amount
potentially in excess of US$ 2.2 billion, compared with
the figure actually recorded in 1996. Brazil’s losses
attributable to the competitiveness effect are estimated
at US$ 2 billion for the period, equivalent to 90% of
the total lost market share or 27% of the value exported
in 1992. The two countries most involved in Brazil’s
net losses of competitiveness during the period were
Mexico (26%) and China (12%).
Between 1992 and 2001, Brazil gained market
share in the amount of US$ 1.1 billion through the
competitiveness effect, although this was only possible
thanks to Brazil’s increased share in U.S. imports of
small aircraft. All the other sectors taken together posted
losses from this same effect for a total of US$ 162
million. Brazil’s market gains during the period were
associated with losses by Japan, the United Kingdom,
Canada and France, which accounted for 64% of
Brazil’s net gains by country. China (33%) and Mexico
(19%), on the other hand, were the main countries
responsible for Brazil’s net losses.
A detailed analysis of price trends in Brazil and
Mexico for a representative sample of products revealed
that, although the real exchange rate performance
favoured Mexican exports to the United States between
1992 and 1996, accounting for nearly one half of
Brazil’s losses to Mexico, Brazilian prices –after
allowing for import duties– were increasingly more
competitive with those of Mexico. Accordingly, Brazil’s
losses to Mexico attributable to the NAFTA effect are
estimated at US$ 300 million, equivalent to 13% of
Brazil’s net losses for the period analysed, or
approximately 3.5% of Brazilian exports to the United
States in 1996. Although still relatively low, this
percentage is significantly higher than the estimates of
trade diversion from Brazil to Mexico made prior to
the implementation of NAFTA.
(Original: English)
dropped to 12.5% between 1992 and 2001. The main country
responsible for Brazil’s losses during the latter period was Japan,
followed by Mexico, the Czech Republic and Slovakia. In Brazil’s
losses of semi-finished products of iron or non-alloy steel,
containing by weight less than 0.25% of carbon, of rectangular
(including square) cross-section, the width measuring less than
twice the breadth (HS 7207211), Mexico accounted for 27%
between 1992 and 1996 but did not have any impact between 1992
and 2001, since it was a net loser of market share during that period.
Germany accounted for 43% of Brazilian losses between 1992 and
1996, followed by Canada with 19%.
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